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Our study investigates the effect of Japanese horizontal keiretsu group membership on 
firm risk and return. Like prior studies, our results show that horizontal keiretsu membership has 
a negative effect on firm profitability. However, we find that horizontal keiretsu networks are 
likely to increase the gap between targeted and realized returns, which we call the outcome-
aspiration gap. Moreover, in contrast to prior studies, our results indicate that keiretsu 
membership does not enable member firms to reduce risks by smoothing profitability. Instead, 
our findings provide evidence that is counter to the conventional notion that Japanese horizontal 
keiretsu allow their member firms to trade off profits for reduced risk. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A prevailing view of the motivations that underlie the incentives to become and/or 
remain a member of a Japanese horizontal keiretsu is that keiretsus play a role as an insurance 
mechanism for firms by protecting them from foreign takeovers, providing financial support in 
troubled times, and creating preferential purchasing arrangements (Dow & McGuire, 1999; 
Gerlach, 1992). Tabeta (1998) and Tabeta and Rahman (1999), for example, suggested that 
keiretsu members may mitigate opportunism within small numbers bargaining. Further, Wang, 
Huang, and Bansal (2005) found that keiretsu firms derive a benefit from membership in an 
economic crisis. In return for this insurance against risk, horizontal keiretsu members accept 
lower average profitability (Lincoln, Gerlach, & Ahmadjian, 1996; Nakatani, 1984; Weinstein & 
Yafeh, 1995). Thus, horizontal keiretsu members are generally considered to prefer low risks and 
low returns, where profit is sacrificed in exchange for a reduction in firm performance variability. 
Japan’s horizontal keiretsu system, however, is currently in a state of significant change. 
As reported by Business Week, for example, these networks appear to be under great pressure to 
disaggregate and restructure due to recent shifts in the global business environment that have 
diminished the ability of the horizontal keiretsu system to deliver the intended benefits (see, e.g., 
Business Week; March 15, 1999). At the corporate level, member firms such as Niigata Steel 
have gone bankrupt, Mitsui Mining and Japan Metals & Chemicals are reconstructing their 
organizations, and Toho Rayon has been integrated by another keiretsu group firm. Another 
example of this trend is the merger of Sakura Bank (from the Mitsui keiretsu) with Sumitomo 
Bank to create Mitsui-Sumitomo Bank. Also, Mizuho Financial Group has joined with Fuji Bank 
(from the Fuyo keiretsu), Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank (from the DKB keiretsu), and the independent 
Industrial Bank of Japan. Restructuring among keiretsu networks has also been observed in the   3
insurance, steel, and chemical industries. These changes are significant because the six major 
keiretsu groups exert a great deal of influence on the Japanese economy (Dow & McGuire, 
1999); excluding banks, they hold 13.2 percent of total capital of the Japanese listed companies 
in 1999. In terms of total assets and sales of Japanese listed companies, they hold 11.2 and 10.8 
percent respectively (Japan Fair Trade Commission, 2001). 
If keiretsu members truly enjoy a beneficial risk/return tradeoff, as suggested by previous 
studies, it is unclear why horizontal keiretsu are restructuring and/or reorganizing. The objective 
of this paper, therefore, is to re-examine the conventional thinking on the relationship between 
keiretsu membership and the risk and return performance of keiretsu members, since recent 
significant changes both outside and inside group firms have cast doubt on the traditional view 
that group membership leads to a net economic benefit. Although the research on business 
groups has become an important topic in the field of strategic management as well as network 
theory (Tabeta, 1998; Tabeta & Rahman, 1999; Wang et al., 2005), we still know very little 
about how business group membership influences the performance outcomes of member firms 
(Gulati, 1998; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). 
Although some previous studies used the keiretsu definition suggested by the Research 
on Keiretsu (RoK), Miwa and Ramseyer (2002: 171) suggested that “the RoK merely allocates 
firms by the principal source of their loans—not cross-shareholdings, not trading ties, not 
personnel exchanges” and thus RoK measure is unsuitable for classification of horizontal 
keiretsu. Therefore, in this study, we define the horizontal keiretsu as the six major bank-centred 
groups and a reliable indicator of membership within these groups as defined by inclusion in the 
keiretsu Presidents’ Council. 
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THE JAPANESE HORIZONTAL KEIRETSU SYSTEM 
The horizontal keiretsu is a dual faceted organizational system. It is a governance system 
that structures economic transactions among diversified member firms through the use of 
incentive mechanisms (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). Horizontal keiretsu also 
represent social systems in which economic transactions are embedded in social network of the 
member firms (Granovetter, 1994, 1995). Keiretsu membership therefore affects performance 
(both risk and return) of member firms by influencing the structure and the nature of their 
economic transactions through its unique governance mechanism and social exchanges among 
member firms. 
Positive Effects of Keiretsu Membership on Performance 
Research suggests that horizontal keiretsu membership reduces risks in several ways. 
First, horizontal keiretsu member firms mutually monitor the activities of other members, 
exchange personnel, share information as well as capital, and maintain cross-shareholdings. 
Mutual monitoring and information sharing reduce information asymmetry among the member 
firms, thereby reducing transaction costs. Reduced information-asymmetry and cross-
shareholding together also reduce the agency problem between managers and owners of member 
firms. Further, internal capital sharing reduces financial costs. Cross-shareholdings among the 
member firms reduce the risks of hostile takeovers. In particular, the main bank system in a 
horizontal keiretsu is said to play a central role in reducing agency problems between owners, 
debtors, and managers of the horizontal keiretsu member firms. Main banks are the largest 
debtors, and often the major shareholders, of the member firms and have information advantages 
over other financial institutions due to their long-term relationships. As a result, the main banks 
suffer fewer agency problems and, therefore, horizontal keiretsu membership relieves liquidity   5
constraints (Aoki, 1990; Hoshi, Kashyap, & Scharfstein, 1991). 
The bank-centered horizontal keiretsu system provides a so called “insurance 
mechanism” (Nakatani, 1984). When a member firm is financially distressed, for example, the 
main bank in a horizontal keiretsu group normally takes the initiative in lending capital to or 
investing in the troubled firm, sometimes dispatching personnel to the corporate board of the 
troubled firm (Sheard, 1989). Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) and Lincoln, et al. (1996), 
for example, found that the bank-centered horizontal keiretsu structure reduced the financial risk 
of the member firms when they encountered significant economic distress and that those member 
firms with stronger main bank affiliations were less likely to fail. 
Horizontal keiretsu member firms also mitigate financial risks by sharing know-how with 
member firms operating in different industries. Prior research has suggested that member firms 
often transfer technological solutions from one industry to solve issues in another where those 
solutions were either rare or unknown (e.g., Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Sutton & Hargadon, 
1996). In fact, a survey conducted by the Japan Fair Trade Commission (2001) also indicated 
that know-how, information, and brand sharing are among the most critical means of risk 
reduction in a horizontal keiretsu group. 
Horizontal keiretsu membership may also enhance the profitability of member firms in 
several ways. First, horizontal keiretsu firms have greater reputation and recognition than do 
independent firms. The member firms benefit from the group’s overall reputation in that they can 
more easily attract talented employees, build strong market recognition and presence, and 
negotiate better deals with financial, government, and professional institutions, as well as with 
market intermediaries such as suppliers and customers. Second, horizontal keiretsu members 
share strong social ties, which shape economic actions by creating unique opportunities and   6
access to those opportunities (Uzzi, 1996). Firms with strong ties develop social capital among 
member firms through which they exchange and combine tacit and complementary knowledge to 
create unique intellectual capital, which in turn contributes to development of organizational 
advantages (Burt, 1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Member firms also benefit from investment 
in relation-specific assets that facilitates joint learning and production, and reduces opportunism 
in transactions by enforcing formal safeguards (e.g., financial and investment hostages) as well 
as informal safeguards (e.g., goodwill, trust, and embeddedness), all of which contribute to 
enhancing relational rents of the member firms (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
Negative Effects of Keiretsu Membership on Performance 
Horizontal keiretsu membership may also have a negative impact on firm performance. 
One source of this negative impact lies in the fact that horizontal keiretsu member firms tend to 
favour strongly economic transactions with firms within their own horizontal keiretsu. Thus, 
member firms would have limited opportunities to explore external partners who may offer 
better transactional opportunities because they may possess superior complementary assets as 
compared to member firms and/or may be more willing to share financial risks through joint 
operations and learning. The confinement of transactions within the horizontal keiretsu 
boundaries, therefore, lowers the profitability of member firms due to limited access to external 
profit opportunities and increases in agency costs due to limited diversification opportunities. 
A second source of the negative effect of horizontal keiretsu membership is that the 
horizontal keiretsu requires a great deal of coordination. Member firms are active in a variety of 
unrelated businesses that have diverse demands, facing diverse challenges. Thus, coordination of 
the various, perhaps even competing, interests is a source of significant costs. Gulati and Singh 
(1998: 782), for example, argue that coordination costs stem from “the anticipated organizational   7
complexity of decomposing tasks among partners along with ongoing coordination of activities 
to be completed jointly or individually across organizational boundaries and the related extent of 
communication and decisions that would be necessary.” Difficulties in coordination inflate 
transaction costs and thus reduce profits of member firms. These difficulties also destabilize 
transactions among the member firms and hence increase the risk of unsatisfactory outcomes. 
Third, the horizontal keiretsu member firm may be subject to greater risk for reasons that 
relate to the inner workings of these groups’ financial structures. For example, horizontal 
keiretsu member firms appear to be more highly leveraged and are less liquidity constrained than 
non-horizontal keiretsu firms due to their greater reliance on loans from their central banks 
(Hoshi et al., 1990). Consequently, horizontal keiretsu members are faced with greater financial 
risk than non-horizontal keiretsu firms because the former have a greater reliance on a single 
sources of financing than do the latter (Hoshi et al., 1991). 
Finally, social relationships developed within a horizontal keiretsu may not be easily 
transferred to outside the boundary of the horizontal keiretsu group. While social relationships 
make exchanges of know-how and information among the member firms more efficient, they can 
also become a source of inertia which may impede an ongoing need for adaptation and 
adjustment. Coleman (1990), for example, noted that a “given form of social capital that is useful 
for facilitating certain actions may be useless or harmful for others.” Thus, the existing strong 
social relationships may make partnerships between the member firms less flexible to changes 
and often promote a competency trap (Levitt & March, 1988) in which the firms make escalating 
commitments to investment in existing competences. Rigidity in social relationships increases 
the risks of organizational change and keeps the member firms from exploring new business 
transactions with other partners, which impede profit opportunities that these member firms   8
could have. 
In general, prior research does not provide clear evidence that diversified businesses 
organized within a corporate group, as is typically observed in a horizontal keiretsu, perform 
better or even as good as business groups that are more closely related (see e.g., Christensen & 
Montgomery, 1981; Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989), suggesting 
that the positive relationship between horizontal keiretsu membership and return remains an 
empirical question. Furthermore, a growing number of studies provide evidence that there are 
many cases in which risk sharing mechanisms either do not exist or do not function well in 
certain business groups (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005). Taken together, this suggests that horizontal 
keiretsu membership may not provide a beneficial risk and return trade off as has been suggested 
in some prior research. Therefore, we examine this question to shed new light on this important 
question. 
METHODOLOGY 
Data. In this paper, we use the sample from Nakatani’s (1984) study, which listed 317 
firms since one of our research objectives is to compare our findings with prior research. We use 
269 firms, which can be observed for 24 years between 1977-2000
1. Of the 269 firms that 
appeared over this period, 57 are firms that belong to the Presidents’ Council (i.e., Shacho-kai) 
of the six major horizontal keiretsu groups, while 212 are independent firms. The annual data for 
each sample firm are collected from the Nikkei NEEDS, one of the most reliable and 
comprehensive sources of financial and non-financial information on the listed firms in Japan. 
Dependent variables. Both net profits on assets (RoA) and sales (RoS) are used as 
                                                 
1 Of 48 firms which disappeared  from Nakatani’s list, 23 firms have gone bankrupt or delisted from stock markets 
and 25 firms were merged or integrated. As a robustness check, we used all firms listed in Tokyo Stock Market as of 
the year of 2000, the results are quite similar to those of this study suggesting that the elimination of the firms from 
Nakatani’s sample does not bias our results.    9
measures of firm profitability. We calculate the mean of difference (ri,t) between firm’s 
profitability and industry average profitability for observation period (n) as  







where Ri,t is RoA or RoS of firm i at time t and Rj,t is the average RoA or RoS of industry j at 
time t. In this study, we classify industries into 19 categories based on the definition of Nikkei 
NEEDS. 
Prior research has investigated the relationship keiretsu membership and firm risk. 
Nakatani (1984) and Khanna and Yafeh (2005), for example, found a negative relationship 
between variance of operating income on assets and keiretsu membership. However, in these 
studies, risk is often defined as the extent to which there is uncertainty about whether expected 
outcomes will be realized (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Underlying this definition is that risk can be 
measured as the gap between realized and targeted outcomes, which we call here the “outcome-
aspiration gap.” To calculate the outcome-aspiration gap, we obtain data from Kessan Tanshin 
(flash reports of financial results), which is an overview of financials and listed firms in Japanese 
stock markets which have an obligation to disclose financial information prior to settling 
accounts at the general meeting of shareholders. One of unique feature of Kessan Tanshin is that 
this report contains information on financial aspiration level for next year. We calculate the 
outcome-aspiration gap by subtracting targeted RoS from realized RoS on an annual basis and 
then averaging these values over observation period as 




where li,t is the difference of targeted RoS of firm i and that of industry average. Targeted RoS is 
usually determined at the time of t-1. Although strategic management researchers often use the   10
term risk to mean downside unpredictability of business outcome variables (e.g., Miller & Reuer, 
1996), we include a full range of outcomes, either positive and negative (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). 
In addition to the outcome-aspiration gap, we add standard deviation measures of RoS and RoA 
into our analysis to enable us to compare our results with prior studies. 
Independent variables. In this paper, we focus on the six major industrial groups in 
Japan, the horizontal or bank-centered horizontal keiretsu: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, 
DKB, and Sanwa  (Flath, 1996; Khanna & Yafeh, 2005). Prior studies commonly identified 
keiretsu membership as the Research on Keiretsu (RoK), Dodwell’s Industrial Groups in Japan, 
or Toyo Keizai’s Kigyo Keiretsu Soran. In this study, we rely on the definition of the Kigyo 
Keiretsu Soran, because our interests are in the specific details of keiretsu membership. The 
relationships among member firms are characterized by cross-shareholding, central bank 
financing, information exchange, long term contracting, and exchange of executive officers 
among the member firms within their groups. Based on Lincoln et al. (1996), we use three 
variables to define horizontal keiretsu; membership in the Presidents’ Council, equity ties, and 
debt ties. Membership in the Presidents’ Council is measured by a dummy variable, coded as one 
for those firms that belong to a horizontal keiretsu group and zero for independent firms. 
Measures of equity ties and debt ties are used because they reflect the strength of the firms’ 
keiretsu dependence. In addition, we add the keiretsu definition of RoK to enable us to compare 
our research with prior studies. 
We also include several firm-specific variables. For example, firm size and age are 
included since horizontal keiretsu firms are larger and older than non-horizontal keiretsu firms, 
on average. In addition, we control for product and geographical diversification as they factors 
may have significant effects on annual changes of profitability. We use the entropy concept as a   11
measurement of product diversification (Palepu, 1985), since this measure is superior to other 
metrics (Attaran & Zwick, 1987). The diversification data were obtained the Japan Company 
Handbook based on Delios and Beamish (1999). We employed the export ratio as geographical 
expansion, which is hypothesized to influence firm risk negatively. In addition, we include a 
measure of slack resources in our models since scholars have found that a firm’s slack has a 
significant effect on firm risk and return given that these resources facilitate information 
gathering and environmental adaptation (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983; Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 
2004). Following prior studies, we use the current ratio (ratio of current asset to liabilities) and 
debt ratio (the ratio of debt to equity) to measure the degree of slack resources. All control 
variables are averaged. Table 1 provides the descriptive characteristics and correlation 
coefficients among our variables for observation period. 
----------------------------------- 
insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
In this paper, we examine the associations between firm risk/return and keiretsu 
membership using maximum likelihood estimation for multiple regression. All tests for statistical 
significance are two-tailed. 
RESULTS 
Like previous studies (e.g., Khanna & Yafeh, 2005; Nakatani, 1984), Table 2 shows that 
horizontal keiretsu membership is negatively and statistically significantly associated with both 
firm profitability (i.e., RoA and RoS adjusted by industry average) over the periods of 1977-
2000. For example, the regression coefficients of the Presidents’ Council membership dummy is 
significantly associated with RoA (β = -0.37, p < 0.1) and with RoS (β = -0.40, p < 0.1). The 
coefficients of debt ties within keiretsu are also negatively and significantly associated with RoA   12
(β = -0.01, p < 0.1), although we did not find a statistically significant relationship between debt 
ties and RoS. 
----------------------------------- 
insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
In contrast to prior studies such as Nakatani (1984), Table 3 shows that the regression 
coefficients of keiretsu measures are positively and significantly associated with outcome-
aspiration gap: Presidents’ Council measure (β = 0.39 p < 0.01), equity ties (β = 0.01, p < 0.1), 
and debt ties (β = 0.01 p < 0.05). However, according to the RoK definition, keiretsu 
membership is not significantly associated with the outcome-aspiration gap.  
----------------------------------- 
insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Table 4 shows the keiretsu membership (i.e., Presidents’ Council) dummy is positively 
and significantly associated with both volatility of RoA (β = 0.25, p < 0.1) and RoS (β = 0.32, p 
< 0.01). Debt ties are also positively and significantly associated with volatility of RoA (β = 0.01, 
p < 0.1) and RoS (β = 0.01, p < 0.01), although equity ties have positive but insignificant effects 
on volatility of both measures of profitability. These results suggest that keiretsu membership is 
associated with the volatility of firm RoS rather than RoA. It is surprising that, like Table 3, the 
RoK definition keiretsu dummy is negative but insignificantly associated with volatility.  
----------------------------------- 
insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------- 
As for control variables, firm size has a positive effect on firm profitability and negative 
effect on volatility. The current ratio has a positive effect on firm profitability, although the debt-
equity ratio is negatively associated. Geographic expansion and export ratio have statistically   13
significant and positive effects on firm risk. We cannot find any effect of diversification on risk 
and return. 
CONCLUSION 
This study examines the relationship between horizontal keiretsu membership and firm 
performance. In addition to defining firm risk as the standard deviation of profitability, we 
measure deviation between targeted and realized outcomes over the observation period. 
Although prior studies have often defined firm risk simply as the standard deviation of outcomes 
(Nakatani, 1984, Khanna & Yafef, 2005), our measures more fully account for risk within 
keiretsu. Our results, using both standard deviation and the outcome-aspiration gap, do not 
support the conventional belief that horizontal keiretsu member firms are more likely to achieve 
lower risks and have more stable profits than independent firms. This implies that the reason for 
a firm to continue to be a member of horizontal keiretsu network might not be driven by an 
economic rationale. 
One plausible explanation for the persistence of keiretsu is that the long-term 
relationships among keiretsu members that include cross-share holding, financial 
interdependency with the main banks, and close trading with member firms may build intangible 
exit barriers, or be a cause of inertia, from exiting the keiretsu system. Therefore, even if member 
firms acknowledge that membership does not provide a net economic incentive, they may be 
very slow to leave nonetheless. 
Thus, the continued (although declining) existence of horizontal keiretsu groups may be 
explained by social returns including legitimacy building and reputation spillovers. Perhaps 
horizontal keiretsu networks could better be viewed as communities in which social integration 
gives rise to security and mutual assurance among decision makers through coordination and   14
information sharing rather than as a governance structure that enables efficient integration of 
economic transactions among the member firms. 
The results of our analysis suggest some avenues for future research. First, Table 4 shows 
that our keiretsu measures have positive and significant effects on firm risk, but RoK has no 
significant effects on both volatility of firm RoA and RoS. These results suggest that the effects 
of horizontal keiretsu membership on firm risk may vary according to the measures of keiretsu 
membership
2. We do not imply that previous studies are incorrect or misguided, but simply that 
there is doubt that group membership necessarily provides a beneficial economic trade off for 
keiretsu member firms. Thus, further study on the relationship between keiretsus and firm 
performance needs to retain a focus on accurate definitions and sharp measures of keiretsu 
membership. 
Second, our study indicates that some firm specific variables are highly associated with 
firm performance. For example, firm size has a positive and significant impact on profitability 
and has a negative and statistically significant impact on firm risk. Firm age is not significantly 
associated with both profitability and significant impact on firm risk. Although the results of our 
analysis did not support the argument that internal risk sharing mechanisms, such as product and 
geographical diversification, play a significant role in reducing the risks, a future research effort 
might extend this line of thought by identifying the conditions and factors affecting firms’ 
choices between external risk sharing mechanisms (e.g., business groups and horizontal keiretsu) 
and internal risk sharing mechanisms (e.g., diversification). 
Finally, there has been recently an increasing number of researchers that are focusing on 
                                                 
2 Prior studies have controlled for industry effects on firm risk by using dummy variables. Our results show that 
keiretsu membership is negatively associated with volatility of firm profitability which is consistent with prior 
studies. Thus, the relationship between keiretsu membership and firms risk is clearly influenced by the 
methodological techniques to control the industry effects.   15
various types of business groups in Asia (Carney, 2005; Carney & Gedajlovic, 2003; Chu, 2001; 
Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Kim, Hoskisson, & Tihanyi, 2004; Peng, 2003). Some of these 
researchers argued that the advantages of business groups are contingent upon the stage of 
institutional economic development. In emerging economies, for example, where institutional 
voids impede efficient market transactions, business groups may be more efficient forms of 
governance than market mechanisms (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Peng, 2003). Our results suggest, 
however, that recent significant changes to the keiretsu organization may be caused by the fact 
that the costs of the keiretsu system appears to outweigh the benefits and that, in economically 
developed institutional environments, keiretsu membership is becoming increasingly difficult to 
justify.   16
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
  Variable Mean    s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1  Presidents' Council 
membership  0.21   0.41                                           
2  Equity  ties  5.01    11.83  0.82*                     
3  Debt  ties  5.64    12.04  0.90*  0.82*                   
4  RoK  definition  0.71    0.45  0.21*  0.10  0.21*                 
5  RoA  -0.15    1.32  -0.07  -0.08  -0.10  -0.02               
6 RoS  -0.12    1.66 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06  0.90*                  
7 RoA  Volatility  1.40    1.24 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.34* -0.38*                   
8 RoS  Volatility  1.63    1.98 -0.04 -0.02  0.00 -0.10 -0.26* -0.28*   0.88*              
9  Outcome-aspiration 
gap  2.09    1.98 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 -0.21* -0.26*   0.69* 0.86  *            
10 Size  5.04    0.51 0.39* 0.22* 0.30*  0.16  0.20*  0.12    -0.39* -0.40* -0.33*          
11  Age  63.37    19.99  0.20* 0.06 0.17 0.10  0.02  0.07    -0.07 -0.01  0.04 0.05         
12  Diversification  1.09    0.34 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.11  0.00  0.02    -0.11 -0.06 -0.05 0.10 -0.01       
13 Exports  15.55    15.66  0.06  0.03  0.03 -0.09  0.05  0.02    0.14  0.11  0.07 0.30* -0.19* -0.02    
14 Current  ratio  116.37   75.64 -0.15 -0.11 -0.16 -0.15 0.52* 0.65*    -0.18*  -0.09  -0.05 -0.15  -0.01 0.02 0.01  
15 Debt  equity  ratio  356.97    534.38  0.07  0.11  0.11  0.03 -0.36* -0.32*   0.18*  0.16  0.05 -0.10  0.02 -0.10 -0.07 -0.30*   
  n = 219, * p < 0.01                                   20
 
Table 2. Regression results for profitability 
   Return on assets (RoA)  Return on sales (RoS) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Presidents'  Council  -0.3697    +           -0.3970  +          
        membership  (0.1771)            (0.2005)           
E q u i t y   t i e s      - 0 . 0 0 7 5              - 0 . 0 0 9 1          
     (0.0057)            (0.0064)        
Debt  ties        -0.0106  +           -0.0084      
        ( 0 . 0 0 4 8 )           ( 0 . 0 0 6 6 )     
RoK  definition          -0.0729            -0.0062   
          (0.1470)          (0.1667)  
Size  0.7988    *** 0.9788 *** 0.7610 *** 0.6671 ***  0.9099 *** 0.8333 *** 0.8454 *** 0.7773 ***
  (0.1472)   (0.1437)  (0.1430)  (0.1379)  (0.1667)  (0.1583)  (0.1623)  (0.1568)  
Age  0.0010      -0.0002   0.0006   -0.0004   0.0051   0.0039   0.0044   0.0037  
  (0.0034)   (0.0033)  (0.0033)  (0.0033)  (0.0038)  (0.0037)  (0.0038)  (0.0038)  
Diversification  -0.2232     -0.2038   -0.2350   -0.2399   -0.1438   -0.1529   -0.1554   -0.1467   
  (0.1915)   (0.2109)  (0.1919)  (0.1938)  (0.2168)  (0.2176)  (0.2178)  (0.2203)  
Exports  -0.0051     -0.0047   -0.0052   -0.0045   -0.0069   -0.0068   -0.0069   -0.0066   
  (0.0045)   (0.0040)  (0.0045)  (0.0045)  (0.0050)  (0.0051)  (0.0051)  (0.0051)  
Current  ratio  0.0081    *** 0.0083 *** 0.0082 *** 0.0084 ***  0.0137 *** 0.0138 *** 0.0137 *** 0.0139 ***
  (0.0009)   (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  
Debt  equity  ratio  -0.0005    *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 ***  -0.0004 *  -0.0004 *  -0.0004 *  -0.0004 * 
  (0.0001)   (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Constant  -4.6103    *** -4.1989 *** -4.4036 *** -4.0063 ***  -6.1502 *** -5.7351 *** -5.8157 *** -5.4914 ***
  (0.7591)   (0.7204)  (0.7358)  (0.7083)  (0.8593)  (0.8144)  (0.8350)  (0.8045)  
            
Pearson  chi-squares  285.11 *** 287.95 *** 286.18 *** 289.61 ***  365.40 *** 368.05 *** 368.60 *** 372.31 ***
n = 269, + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
    21
  
Table 3. Regression results for outcome-aspiration gap 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Presidents'  Council  0.3853  **          
    membership  (0.1152)              
Equity  ties     0.0072  +       
     (0.0032)        
Debt  ties        0.0097  *    
        (0.0043)     
RoK  definition          -0.1036   
          (0.1031)  
Size  -1.1288 *** -1.0356 ***  -1.0727 *** -0.9393 ***
 (0.1634)   (0.1545)   (0.1563)   (0.1452)  
Age  0.0050   0.0053   0.0053   0.0053  
 (0.0027)   (0.0027)   (0.0028)   (0.0028)  
Diversification  0.0475   0.0425   0.0530   0.0333  
 (0.1503)   (0.1512)   (0.1514)   (0.1516)  
Exports  0.0128 *** 0.0126 ***  0.0126 *** 0.0117 ***
 (0.0032)   (0.0032)   (0.0032)   (0.0032)  
Current  ratio  -0.0014   -0.0014   -0.0014   -0.0014   
 (0.0008)   (0.0008)   (0.0008)   (0.0008)  
Debt  equity  ratio  -0.0001   -0.0001   -0.0001   -0.0001   
 (0.0001)   (0.0001)   (0.0001)   (0.0001)  
Constant  5.8285 *** 5.4020 ***  5.5619 *** 5.0581 ***
 (0.7642)   (0.7371)   (0.7388)   (0.6992)  
      
Pearson chi-squares  836.22 *** 848.05 ***  842.15 *** 852.74 ***
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Table 4. Regression results for volatility 
  RoA RoS 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Presidents'  Council  0.2480    +           0.3153  **          
        membership  (0.1117)            (0.0925)           
Equity  ties     0.0056             0.0060         
     (0.0032)            (0.0036)        
Debt  ties        0.0073  +           0.0092  **    
        ( 0 . 0 0 3 4 )           ( 0 . 0 0 2 6 )     
RoK  definition          -0.0086            -0.0705   
          (0.0820)          (0.0881)  
Size  -0.7810    *** -0.7347 *** -0.7569 *** -0.7161 ***  -0.9750 *** -0.9072 *** -0.9466 *** -0.8385 ***
  (0.1128)   (0.1072)  (0.1084)  (0.1021)  (0.1308)  (0.1245)  (0.1258)  (0.1181)  
Age  0.0016      0.0021   0.0018   0.0022   0.0026   0.0031   0.0028   0.0031  
  (0.0021)   (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0023)  (0.0023)  (0.0023)  (0.0023)  
Diversification  0.0506      0.0553   0.0596   0.0630   -0.0405   -0.0408   -0.0296   -0.0381  
  (0.1175)   (0.1177)  (0.1175)  (0.1179)  (0.1274)  (0.1280)  (0.1278)  (0.1281)  
Exports  0.0131    *** 0.0130 *** 0.0130 *** 0.0127 ***  0.0120 *** 0.0118 *** 0.0119 *** 0.0113 ***
  (0.0023)   (0.0023)  (0.0023)  (0.0023)  (0.0027)  (0.0027)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  
Current  ratio  -0.0002     -0.0003   -0.0002   -0.0003   -0.0004   -0.0005   -0.0004   -0.0005   
  (0.0004)   (0.0005)  (0.0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  
Debt  equity  ratio  -0.0001      -0.0001   -0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   -0.0001   0.0001  
  (0.0001)   (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Constant  4.4275    *** 4.1901 *** 4.3028 *** 3.9462 ***  5.3878 *** 5.0639 *** 5.2418 *** 4.8075 ***
  (0.5443)   (0.5196)  (0.5239)  (0.4951)  (0.6150)  (0.5919)  (0.5933)  (0.5657)  
            
Pearson chi-squares  697.14  *** 702.09 *** 698.31 *** 709.08 ***  812.44 *** 822.53 *** 813.49 *** 828.11 ***
n = 269, + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 